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Abstract
While it is well-established in the literature that obese people are discriminated against in the working environment, little is known about their
own actual behavior. Our experimental setting investigates whether these
potentially discriminated people respond in a different way when faced
with the opportunity of earning a positive amount of money. Significant
lower money requests by people who are self-reported as obese confirm
our self-discrimination hypothesis, offering an additional explanation for
the wage gap; Thus, it seems that these obese people earn less not only
because of discrimination against them but also because they themselves
are less demanding. Interestingly, results are more robust for females,
especially for those who “feel”, but they are not actually, obese.
JEL: C93, J16
Keywords: Discrimination, obesity, field experiment, gender, selfperception.
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1

Introduction

Obesity is an obvious appearance characteristic which severely stigmatizes individuals and provokes multiple forms of prejudice and discrimination against
them in several social environments (Puhl and Heuer (2009) for an extensive
review). Numerous empirical studies report the negative effects of obesity measured by body mass index- on labour success measured by wages and employment rates, (Atella et al., 2008; Cawley, 2004, 2007; Cawley and Danziger,
2005; Han et al., 2009)1 , a result which is also supported across european studies2 (Brunello and D’Hombres, 2007; Garcia and Quintana-Domeque, 2006).
Furthermore, in more recent studies, where more complex measures of obesity
are employed, the general result of obesity discrimination on the working environment still holds, although weaker (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008; Johansson
et al., 2009; Wada and Tekin, 2010)3 . Finally, evidence on obesity discrimination
can be also found in experimental psychology studies. In a recent meta-analysis
on weight discrimination in employment settings by Roehling et al. (2008), it
was demonstrated that overweight job applicants and employees were evaluated
more negatively and had more negative employment outcomes4 compared to
non-overweight counterparts.
1 Cawley (2004) finds that for white females, an increase of 64 pounds above average weight
was associated with a 9% decrease in wages. Han et al. (2009) find that the negative relationship between the BMI and wages is larger in occupations requiring social interactions and for
older people. Atella et al. (2008) show that cultural, environmental or institutional settings do
not seem to be able to explain differences among countries on the wage-obesity relationship,
leaving room for a pure discriminatory effect hypothesis.
2 Brunello and D’Hombres (2007) observe that a 10% increase in the average BMI reduces
the hourly wages of males by 1.9% and females by 3.3% while Garcia and Quintana-Domeque
(2006) find a negative correlation between wages and obesity, ranging from -2 to -10 % only
for women.
3 Burkhauser and Cawley (2008) claim that total body fat is negatively correlated with
employment for some groups. Johansson et al. (2009) find that only waist circumference has
a negative association with wages for women. Wada and Tekin (2010) report that body fat is
associated with decreased wages for both males and females while they also present evidence
suggesting that free fat mass is associated with increased wages.
4 Studies were included in the analysis if simulated employment decisions were involved and
demonstrated an effect size between target weight and job-related outcome variables. Outcome variables included hiring recommendations, qualification/suitability ratings, disciplinary
decisions, salary assignments, placement decisions, and coworker ratings.
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While all aforementioned examples are referred to the discriminative behavior of the employers who represent the demand side of the labor market, little
is known about the behavior of employees who represent the supply side of this
market. In this study, we propose that part of the aforementioned wage gap
could be attributed to the differences between obese and non-obese people in
their initial requests. Although there could be other explanations for the gap
across weight, we consider that initial requests, or initial offers, are important
because they can serve as anchors in the negotiation, influencing subsequent
offers and final agreements. The importance of the adjustment from an anchor in making judgments under uncertainty was firstly described by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), while several empirical and experimental studies in the
negotiation-bargaining literature have confirmed its importance (Galinsky and
Mussweiler, 2001; Ritov, 1996).
According to our experimental setting, subjects, after filling out a questionnaire, are asked for how much money they would like to request as a compensation for the effort they made to complete this particular questionnaire and for
the information they provided us. We consider that this open-ended question,
inspired by Greig (2008), does have an implementation on labor markets as it
mimics the commonly asked employers’ question to the job candidates: “How
much money would you like to receive for doing this particular job?”5 .
Moreover, in the aforementioned questionnaire, subjects are asked, among
others, to reveal through a 7-scale likert question their obesity level. Thus, this
paper focus on “perceived obesity” as a measure of obesity. Our argument and
the main contribution of this paper is that in the “self-discrimination story” the
relevant fact is to detect how people feel and not how people are actually or look
to others regarding their obesity. For this reason and in order to be able to make
5 Moreover,

subjects have to complete out our research questionnaire, which simulates the
task that every employee has to accomplish in his/her job. We, therefore, manage to create
work environment conditions without using any artificial framing.

3

reasonable comparisons, apart from subjects self-reports on obesity, we also have
an estimation of subjects’ obesity level by the 27 interviewers participating in
this study.
In this study, we are also interested in investigating the effect of the interaction between obesity and gender on initial requests. Many studies on gender
(Gerhart, 1990; Rosenbaum, 1984; Barron, 2003; Greig, 2008) demonstrate that
men make significantly larger salary requests than women, a fact that leads to
a lower first salary and consequently to a more modest career advancement.
According to this literature, differences in mens’ and womens’ entitlement were
due to several factors: group-based social inequities, intra-group and intrapersonal comparison biases, group differences in reference standards (Major,
1994), socialization pressure (Wade, 2001), effectiveness in competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003).
These arguments are compatible with the main findings of our study if it
is considered that obese people, like women, belong to a group which has been
treated differently and discriminated in the working environment. Taking into
account that weight-related stigmatization is considered as one of the most
severe stigmas6 , we turn our attention to socio-psychological oriented explanations. Self-fulfilling prophecy theory (Merton, 1948) is one of these. According
to Merton (1948), “a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when a perceiver’s false belief
influences the perceiver’s treatment of a target which, in turn, shapes the targets
behavior in an expectancy-consistent manner.”
In the working environment though, the above theory is applied as follows:
Employers7 who form false general beliefs for obese employees8 , develop dif6 Due

to visibility and perceived controllability of the weight-related stigmatized condition.
there is evidence (Wang et al., 2004) that obese people, unlike other minority groups,
appear to hold negative attitudes toward in-group members (weight bias internalization), no
distinction between obese and non-obese employers is necessary to be made.
8 Research to date (see Puhl and Heuer (2009) for an extensive review) suggests that
the most common stereotypes about obese employees include views that they are less hardworking, less perseverant, less conscientious, less agreeable, less emotionally stable, less ex7 Since

4

ferential treatment towards their obese employees who eventually shape their
behavior in an expectancy-consistent manner. Expecting lower wages, obeseworkers request or they are willing to accept lower wages. In Piketty (1998), the
author gives a possible socio-economic interpretation of self-fulfilling prophecy
theory by considering that the well-known model of statistical discrimination
can be supported by the aforementioned theory as follows: since employers expect lower-class agents to be less qualified for top jobs, they promote them less
often, so that lower class agents are discouraged and adopt a behavior that validates the employers’ expectations. Following the same reasoning, we suggest
that obese agents adopt a behavior that validates the employers’ expectations
by requesting lower salaries.
Apart from the self-fulfilling prophecy theory, socio-psychologists have also
highlighted the negative relationship between self esteem and obesity. Obese
people are more vulnerable to lower self-esteem which, in turn, is correlated
with lower initial wage requests and, by extension, with lower earnings. Regarding obesity and self-esteem, there are several psychological studies reporting a
negative correlation between them (Biro et al., 2006; Carr and Friedman, 2005;
Hesketh et al., 2004; French et al., 1995; Wardle and Cooke, 2005)9 .
As far as the relation between self-esteem and earnings is concerned, early
childhood intervention programs provide indisputable evidence for their positive
correlation. These programs raised lifetime earnings by improving students’ social skills and motivation (Heckman, 2000). Moreover, in two experimental
traverted etc. than their normal-weight counterparts. Nevertheless, it is also true that obesity
is related to less self-control and health problems, two aspects which have negative impact on
work outcomes.
9 In a nationally representative study of over 3000 adults, Carr and Friedman (2005) find
that obese individuals report lower levels of self-acceptance than normal-weight persons, which
is fully mediated by perceptions of weight discrimination. Along the same lines Biro et al.
(2006) report that BMI is an important predictor of self-esteem on a 2379 sample of 9 and
10 years old girls while Hesketh et al. (2004) find that obesity/overweight precedes low selfesteem in a study of 1157 elementary school children in Australia. In the same direction, but
more moderated, are the results of the two comprehensive reviews of self-esteem and obesity
in youths by French et al. (1995) and Wardle and Cooke (2005).
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studies investigating the relation between height and earnings (Persico et al.,
2004) and between attractiveness and earnings (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006),
the negative relation between self-esteem and earnings is also confirmed. While
in these studies it is not clear why low self-esteem people end up with lower
earnings, a remarkable study by Baumeister et al. (2003) concludes that occupational success may boost self-esteem rather than the reverse.
Finally, anticipating a strong negative relationship between obesity and
beauty, we also suggest that initial wage requests may be one of the main
reasons of the so-called “beauty premium” (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994) in
wages. Several worth-mentioned experimental studies10 have demonstrated the
positive relationship between beauty and earnings across different bargaining
settings (ultimatum, public good, trust game, labor market experiments). To
our surprise, we found that beauty and obesity are not correlated, while beauty
(unlike obesity) does not have any effect on money requests.
To sum up, the central issue of this experimental study is expressed through
two basic questions:
• Do “obese” people, who self-report a higher-than-median level of obesity,
request less money than “non-obese” people ?
• Does the interaction between obesity and gender make any effect on money
requests?
The study is organized as follows: the experimental methods are described
in detail in section 2, while the data and results are presented in section 3 and
4, respectively. In section 5, we make a comparison between self and monitor
10 Solnick

and Schweitzer (1992) rejected the hypothesis that attractive people will demand
more than unattractive people in an ultimatum game but reported higher final payoffs for
attractive people. In a recent public goods experiment, Andreoni and Petrie (2008) report
that higher payoffs for attractive people are not due to differential behavior by attractive
people but due to how others respond to beauty. Moreover, Eckel and Wilson (2004) find that
attractive people are trusted at higher rates under a trust game framework.
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reported data on obesity. Finally, section 6 concludes with a discussion of the
results.

2

Experimental Methods11

One of the most important advantages of this research project is the fact that we
conduct an economic field experiment with quite a large sample (270 subjects)
consisting of various types of people from different socioeconomic backgrounds.
In order to achieve this aim, 27 mediators-interviewers12 of different ages (20-60
years old) and socioeconomic background were fully trained to recruit subjects
and conduct the experiment. None of the mediators had any past experience
in economic experiments, while their participation in the experiment as “interviewers” solely had a pedagogical aim13 .

2.1

Stage 1: Mediators’ Training

Mediators were trained for a total of six hours. Training included a general
description of experimental economics with special reference made to basic experimental protocols. Additional instructions regarding this specific experiment
were given in detail. Finally, each mediator was asked to recruit 10 subjects to
participate in an economic experiment within one week’s time. We also clearly
stated (especially for the mediators who were also workers) our preference for
employed subjects and a balanced subject pool regarding gender. After the
first week, the mediators were asked to submit a list with the names of the 10
11 Detailed instructions for the whole experimental process are described in Appendix 1.
Questionnaires Q1 and Q2 are provided in Appendix 7 and 8, respectively.
12 Initially, the experiment was designed for 30 interviewers but we manage to find only
29. Two of them were eventually excluded during the experimental process as they were not
following our instructions properly.
13 Upon completion of the course, the students were awarded a grade for a presentation of
the results/conclusions obtained from the data.
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subjects they had recruited14 .

2.2

Stage 2: Questionnaires and Implementation

The second stage of the experiment began with mediators’ answers to questionnaire Q1. After completing Q1, the mediators received ten Q2 questionnaires
and ten envelopes15 , which they delivered to their subjects.
The first two parts of Q2 coincide with the first two parts of Q1. The only
difference between the two questionnaires is that the questions on Q1 were answered by each of the 27 mediators 10 times to describe each of their 10 subjects,
while the questions on Q2 were self-reported and therefore only answered once
by each of the 270 subjects. The following figure shows the general structure of
questionnaires Q1 and Q2.
Figure 1: Questionnaires

In the first part of the questionnaire given to the subjects, Q2a, th subjects
14 In order to protect the subjects’ identities, the mediators were asked to codify the names
so that they would be recognizable only by the corresponding mediator and no one else
15 The envelopes bore the seal of the University of Granada and were used to preserve
subjects’ anonymity from the monitors.
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were requested to answer four (7-level) Likert questions about their appearance,
namely obesity, beauty, height and manner of dress, and five Likert questions
about their personality characteristics, specifically ambition, self-esteem, sociality, creativeness and benevolence. However, only obesity is used as explanatory
variable while beauty, ambition and self-esteem are used as control variables.
The remaining questions ware used to distract subjects’ attention from the real
experimental objectives. For this same reason, an adjusted version of the SallyAnn task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) was included in the second part of the
subjects’ questionnaire, Q2b. The Sally-Ann task is a psychological test which
enables a series of images (see Appendix 7).
Finally, while the third part of the mediators’ questionnaire, Q1c, simply
describes the personal relationship between the mediators and each of their
subjects, the third part of the subjects’ questionnaire, Q2c, actually consists
the dependent variable of our research project. In this part, subjects were asked
to reveal how much money they would like to request as a compensation for the
effort they made to fill out this particular questionnaire and for the information
they provided us. It was also clarified that the money disposed for this research
project was given by the Spanish State and did not belong or affect us.Q2
continues by asking subjects’ to give their name and home address so that the
researchers could send the subjects the money they requested16 .
Moreover, participants were assured about their personal data protection
through the Law on the Protection of Personal Data. Finally, at the end of the
Q2 questionnaire, the subjects were asked if they would be willing to participate
in another experiment in the near future.
The second stage of the experiment concluded by instructing mediators to
provide their subjects with delicate hints about how the payment would be
16 This

was also another way to convince the subjects that we were truly willing to pay them
the money they requested.
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made. In short, they “must” assure their subjects that they are truly going
to receive a positive amount of money if they ask for it. Moreover, it was
emphasized that only those subjects who provide their home address would
be paid. The mediators were also instructed to inform their subjects that the
budget for this particular project was fix and that researchers were willing to
pay subjects according to their claims17 . Finally, the mediators were given
two weeks to administer the Q2 questionnaires to their subjects and return the
completted questionnaires.

2.3

Payments

Finally, the third stage of the experiment began at the moment that the mediators submitted the Q2 questionnaires that had been completed by their subjects.
The questionnaires were submitted in sealed envelopes. As regards the payment
process, the mediators preferred to receive subjects’ payments on their behalf
instead of mailing the money to them. To this end, the interviewers were asked
to submit within two weeks time signed copies of the identity cards of the subjects who had requested money in Q2c. Payments were made two weeks later
according to the following rule: “Subjects who request 10e or more, will be paid
10e. All the rest will receive the exact amount of their request.” Table 1 summarizes relevant information for payments. Rows show the number of people of
not answering (n.a), requesting 0e, or a positive amount of money (> 0e) while
the columns indicate whether subjects provide not any (no-info), incomplete or
complete personal information.

17 We clarified this point using the following wording: “Obviously, we are not going to pay
anyone 1 million e for filling out a questionnaire.”
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Table 1: Personal Information and Money Requests
no-info

incomplete

complete

Total

n.a.

17

5

1

23

0e

53

21

19

93

>0e

2

45

107

154

Total

72

71

127

270

There were 53+17 subjects who requested 0e or gave no answer and also did
not give their personal information. Among those 154 individuals who asked for
a positive amount of money 2 individuals gave no personal data at all while 45
of them provide incomplete data so it was not possible to contact them. From
the sample of 107 subjects who both provide all the necessary personal data
and ask for a positive amount of money, there was a small fraction of subjects
(16%) who either did to give their ID18 or refused to take their money. Finally,
the 89 subjects who asked a positive amount of money, gave complete personal
information and finally provided copies of their ID were paid. The total cost of
the project was 854e .

3

Data Considerations

In this section, we begin our analysis by describing the special characteristics
of the dataset collected during the experimental process. In most cases, the
variables used in our analysis are generated out of the raw data, without any
intervention. However, in the case of the dependent variable money, it was
necessary to transform the initial raw variable.
18 According to the Spanish regulations regarding experimental payments, subjects have to
give a photocopy of their ID when signing the receipt of the payment.

11

3.1

Dependent Variable Money

The dependent variable under consideration is the amount of money that subjects
requested in compensation for the effort they made to fill out the particular
questionnaire and for the information provided us. Despite the fact that the
variable money is initially a continuous variable, we have to take into account
four special characteristics of this variable, especially since regression analysis
is to be applied:
1. 93 subjects (34%) requested 0e.
2. 23 subjects (8%) give no answer regarding money 19 .
3. Among those (58%) who requested a positive amount of money, 4.46% of
them requested more than 250 e
4. There are several focal points (apart from 0) such as 10, 20, 30, 50, 100
which have frequencies of more than 5% each.
Therefore, treating money as an ordinary continuous variable is not so convincing. Moreover, we realized the need to not exclude extreme values from our
regressions since they are of special interest from a theoretical point of view.
Asking for an infinite amount of money is the Nash equilibrium of such a game,
as the participant assures that he/she will receive the highest amount of money
regardless of what the other subjects request.
Instead, it is more convincing to assume that all the subjects who ask for
extremely high amounts of money belong to the same category. Furthermore,
the fact that there are several focal points in the continuous variable suggested
that it would be reasonable and representative to generate categories around
these points. As a result, a more balanced variable with 6 ordered categories is
generated - and used for further analysis - as follows:
19 In

the following analysis we consider no answers as 0e requests.
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label
categories
n

Table 2: Dependent Variable: Money
0
1
2
3
4
0
1 − 15 16 − 30 50 − 70 90 − 100
116
39
46
28
17

5
> 149
24

In the statistical analysis of the next section, the dependent variable money is
represented in three different ways, which correspond to three slightly different
questions.
money(.): is a 6-category ordinal variable which includes all the observations
exactly as described above. This variable attempts to shed light on the
question:“which people request more money? ”
money(1/0): is a dichotomous variable. The first category includes the 115
subjects who requested 0 e, while the second category, which is an aggregation of categories 1-5 of the variable money, includes the 154 persons
who requested a positive amount of money. In this case the question under examination is simply the following: “who actually requests money
and who does not? ”
money(>0): is a 5-category ordinal variable including only the 154 subjects
who asked for a positive amount of money. The conditional question
formed out of this approach is the following: “Among those people requesting a positive amount of money, who requests more? ”
While the first two representations of the variable money may be obvious, the
third one necessitates further explanation. We focus on this specific sub-sample
mainly because we consider that all these people form a group of special interest.
While there are several - sometimes contradicting - reasons to explain why a
person does not request any amount of money (interviewers’ influence, subjects
do not believe in experimental methods, they do not want to provide their
address, etc.), we believe that the people who overpass these limits and finally
13

request a positive amount of money belong to a more homogenous category with
its own distinct argumentation for proceeding in such a way.

3.2

Independent Variables

In our analysis the following independent variables are used:
Self-reported Variables
obesity : an ordinal self-reported explanatory variable describing the level of
subjects’ obesity (from 1=very thin to 7=very obese).
beauty : an ordinal self-reported explanatory variable describing the level of
subjects’ beauty (from 1=very ugly to 7=very beautiful).
ambition: an ordinal self-reported control variable describing the level of subjects’ ambition (from 1=not ambitious at all to 7=very ambitious).
self-conf.: an ordinal self-reported control variable describing the level of subjects’ self-esteem (from 1=not self-esteem at all to 7=very self-esteem).
Although the vast majority of studies on obesity uses BMI as a more accurate
measurement of obesity, we prefer to use the self-reported obesity for two main
reasons: 1) We were interested in comparing subjects’ self-reported obesity with
the corresponded obesity reported by monitors (see section 5). Given that it
is very difficult for monitors to know or even to approximate their subjects’
height and weight20 , we prefer both monitors and subjects to use the same
measurement. 2) The target of the variable obesity is to measure how subjects
perceive themselves rather than how they actually are. Along this line Miller
and Downey (1999) conclude in their meta-analysis that the heavyweight people
do have somewhat low self-esteem, but that the relation is stronger for people who
20 BM I

=

mass(kg)
height(m)2
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perceive themselves as heavyweight than for people who actually are heavyweight,
and thus likely to be perceived as heavyweight by others.
Moreover, it was also realized that the nature of the variable obesity was
not as trivial as the variable beauty. While beauty could be characterized as
a monotonic variable in terms of utility - the more beautiful someone feels the
better he/she is - the case of obesity is not exactly the same. For instance, feeling
that one is very thin does not necessarily imply that one is more attractive than
someone who feels very obese. For this reason, two dummy variables were
generated out of the variable obesity as follows:
dobese: a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the subject reports level 5,
6 or 7 in the question on “obesity” and 0 otherwise,
dthin: a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the subject reports level 1, 2
or 3 in the question on “obesity” and 0 otherwise.
Monitor-reported Variables
female: a dummy self-reported explanatory variable taking the value of 1 if
the subject is female and 0 otherwise.
age: a continuous monitor-reported control variable describing subjects’ age in
years.
wage: a continuous monitor-reported21 control variable describing subjects’
wage in e.
As explained before, monitors were also asked to answer questions regarding
their subjects’ appearance and personality. In later section we will compare the
self-reported obesity with the monitor-reported obesity mr also measured with
a 7-level likert-scale.
21 We

preferred to use monitors’ reports for wage in order to distract subjects’ attention.
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As regards the descriptive statistics of the data, the 27 mediators collected
data from 270 subjects. The subject pool was comprised of 55% females and
35% students. About 37% of the subjects did not work at all, 18% worked in a
low-level job and the remaining 45% had a medium or high-level job. Table 2
below summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
Note that 1 subject did not answer the questionnaire at all, so we have n = 269
self-reported observations and for the variable wage we only refer to 171 workers
of the sample.

Variable
obesity
dobese
dthin
beauty
ambition
self-est.
female
age
wage

N
269
269
269
269
269
269
270
270
171

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Mode Std. Dev
4.18
4
4
1.05
0.33
0
0
0.47
0.20
0
0
0.40
4.79
5
5
0.97
4.52
5
5
1.34
4.49
5
5
1.48
0.55
1
1
0.50
29.33
25
24
9.47
1316
700
1500
848

Min
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
18
100

Max
7
1
1
7
7
7
1
65
7000

From the above table we observe that:
Observation 1: The mean, the median and the mode of the variables beauty,
ambition and self-esteem are much higher than expected. Subjects overestimated their characteristics, although it was emphasized that the median
value is 422 . However, regarding obesity, the mean value approaches the
expected one, while the mode and the median are exactly 4.
It seems that obesity is a more objective and easily observable characteristic.
In other words, different levels of obesity are easily recognized and therefore
subjects are somehow forced to describe themselves more accurately.
22 The Q2 questionnaires included the following hint: note that 4 means neither more (than
the average) nor less.
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4

Results

The aim of the first part of this section is to give an overview of the problem
under examination. To do so, we examine the impact of the explanatory variable
obesity on our dependent variable by analyzing graphic and nonparametric tests.
Finally, in the second part, we advance in our analysis by performing probit
regression analysis which allows us to control for other factors that may impact
our dependent variable (i.e. beauty, gender and other socioeconomic variables).

4.1

Preliminary results

In this subsection we try to shed light on any potential relation or trend between
the dependent variable money(.) and the explanatory variables obesity, without
controlling for other socio-demographic variables that might affect the dependent variable. Figure 2 shows the average amount of money requested by the
members belonging to the seven different levels of the variable obesity. The size
of the bubble is proportional to the number of people belonging to each level
of obesity. Additionally, the number written in each bubble gives the precise
number of subjects in each group.
At first glance there does not appear to be a clear trend between the two variables under examination. However, when focusing more closely on the groups
of people belonging to obesity levels 4-7, a clear negative trend can be seen,
leading to the following observation:
Observation 2: The more obese a subject feels, the less money he/she requests
on average.
Observation 2 is also supported by the nonparametric test (Cuzick and
Mann-Whitney test). As is explained in detail in Appendix 2, the different
requests made by people at obesity level 4 and by people at obesity level 5 and
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Figure 2: Average Money Requests by Obesity Level

Note: The size of the bubbles (and the number shown) is proportional to the number of
people belonging to each of the 7 obesity groups represented on the horizontal axis.

6 are significant and negative23 .
On the other hand, there is no clear pattern for the average requests among
the people who feel thin (level 1-3). Moreover, the combination of these two
observations enforces our argument that the variable obesity could actually be
analyzed better if it is disentangled into two distinct variables, dobese and dthin,
as described in the previous section.

4.2

Regression Analysis

In this section, regression analysis is performed mainly for two reasons: a) we
wish to control for the appearance characteristic of beauty, for the personality
characteristics of ambition and self-esteem and the socioeconomic variables of
age and wage that probably affect the dependent variable, and b) we want to
23 Cuzick test (comparing all medians): z = −1.96, p = 0.051, Mann-Whitney test (comparing obesity 4 with obesity 5): z = 2.28, p = 0.02, Mann-Whitney test (comparing obesity 4
with obesity 6): z = 2.24, p = 0.02
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control for the influence of interviewers on the subjects’ answers.
This second reason is of great importance since we were unable to be present
when the mediators were instructing the subjects and therefore could not monitor them. Although they were specifically instructed not to influence subjects’
answers, we must still take into account that the subjects were either family
members or colleagues24 . Consequently, during the following regression analysis we allow for intragroup correlation and relax the usual requirement that the
observations be independent. That is, the observations are independent across
groups (27 clusters for different interviewers), but not necessarily within groups.
This kind of analysis affects the standard errors and variance-covariance matrix
of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients.
The following table reports the coefficients and the standard errors (in parenthesis) for: two ordered probit regressions (columns 1(a) and 1(b)) on the dependent variable money(.), two probit regressions (columns 2(a) and 2(b)) on the
binary variable money(1/0) and finally two ordered probit regressions (columns
3(a) and 3(b)) on money(> 0); all with the aforementioned cluster specification.
The only difference between regressions of type (a) and (b) is that while the original 7-level obesity is used in the first ones as the main explanatory variable,
the dummies dobese and dthin are engaged in the second ones in order to disentangle the effect. We control for the continuous variables age, age 2 and wage
and for the ordinal variables ambition and self-esteem in all the regressions. No
multicollinearity problem was observed in our regression models
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.

24 A Kruskal-Wallis test on the variable money(.) for significant differences among groups
of people dealing with different mediators confirms this claim (P r. > |z| = 0.0001).
25 See Appendix 3 for Spearman’s rank correlations coefficients among the regressors.
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Table 3: Probit Regressions
Variable

money(.)
1(a)
1(b)

a) appearance
obesity

money(1/0)
2(a)
2(b)

-.109*
(.063)

dobese

.087
(.077)

-.422***
(.124)
-.230
(.212)
.073
(.347)

b) personality
ambition

.095
(.063)
.025
(.060)

self-est.
c) socio-econ
female
age
age 2
wage

.125*
(.077)

-.030
.(090)

-.558***
(.208)
-.0500
(.244)
-.036
(.087)

.098
(.063)
.027
(.060)

.061
(.073)
.041
(.065)

.060
(.073)
.042
(.065)

.110*
(.059)
.043
(.057)

.121**
(.062)
.047
(.058)

-.003
(.167)
-.129**
(.059)
.001*
(.001)
-.000
(.0001)

.000
(.170)
-.128**
(.057)
.001*
(.0007)
-.000
(.000)

-.081
(.226)
-.095
(.071)
.001
(.001)
.0004***
(.0001)

269
0.0000

.055
(.200)
-.133**
(.060)
.001*
(.0007)
-.0002*
(.0001)
2.06*
(1.107)
269
0.0001

-.070
(.219)
-.092
(.073)
.001
(.001)
.0004***
(.0001)

269
0.001

.044
(.200)
-.134**
(.062)
.001*
(.001)
-.0001*
(.0001)
2.042*
(1.128)
269
0.0004

154
0.0000

154
0.0000

constant
N
P r > chi2

-.196**
(.090)
-.340**
(.150)
-.347
(.253)
.110
(.081)

dthin
beauty

-.054
(.077)

money(> 0)
3(a)
3(b)

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter estimates in parentheses.
Significance

level

is

marked

with

*

for

,

p ≤ 0.10 **

for

p ≤ 0.05

and

***

for

p ≤ 0.01.

In addition to the above illustrated models, the interval variable moneyinterv. and the continuos variable money-cont. are also analyzed in Appendix 4
using interval and tobit regression methods26 , respectively. Although one might
consider that these two methods are more adequate for our data, the results are
very similar to those obtained from the ordered probit model (1(a) and 1(b)).
26 In both methods, the data for money requests equal to zero (115 observations) are left
censored, while the data for money requests equal to or higher than 150 (24 observations) are
right censored. These data correspond to category 0 and 5 of the dependent variable money(.)
enabled in the ordered probit model.
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More specifically, the results are identical in terms of significance in the case
of the two main variables under examination (obesity, female). However, for
reasons of simplicity and comparison (with the binary-probit model) we only
show the results of the ordered probit in the main body of this paper.
As we can see from Table 3, regressions 1(a) and 3(a) confirm the negative
association of the dependent variables (money(.) and money(> 0) with obesity. In particular, obesity is associated with money at a 10% significance level
in regression 1(a). However, when people requesting 0e are excluded from the
sample in regression 3(a), the association is even stronger, reaching a 5% significance level. Nonetheless, while the sign of obesity remains negative in regression
2(a), it is not significant.
When disentangling obesity in regressions 1(b) and 3(b), the variable dobese
is observed to be negatively associated at a 1% significant level in both models,
while dthin is not. The same is true in regression 2(b), but dobese is associated
with money(1/0) at a 5% level of significance. All these results suggest that the
negative sign of 1(a), 2(a) and 3(a) is due to the fact that obese subjects (level 5,
6 and 7) request less money, but not because thin subjects request more money.
There 3 main conclusions can be drawn from each of the dependent variables
money(.), money(1/0) and money(> 0):
Result 1:
a) (.): “Obese” subjects request significantly less money than “non-obese” subjects.
b) (1/0): “Obese” subjects request 0e or nothing significantly more times as
compared to “non-obese” subjects.
c) (> 0): Among subjects who request a positive amount of money, “obese”
subjects request significantly less than “non-obese” subjects.
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In other words, “obese” people do not grab the chance to earn a positive
amount of money, and even if they do it, they asked significantly less money
compared to “non-obese” people.
As regards the variable beauty, no significant association with the corresponding dependent variables of models 1(a), 3(a) and 1-3(b) has been reported.
The only exception is regression 2(a) in which beauty is positively and significantly associated with money(1/0) but only at the 10% significance level. Interestingly, obesity is not reported to be significant only in this specific model.
In contrast to previous literature (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1992; Andreoni
and Petrie, 2008; Eckel and Wilson, 2004) the association of beauty with the
dependent variable disappears as soon as the control variables age, wage, ambition and self-esteem are introduced in our regression. As shown in Appendix
5, this is especially true for the variables age and ambition as their inclusion in
the regression process immediately neutralizes the effect of beauty on money(.).
Figure 3: Average Money Requests by Gender & Obesity level

Note: The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of people belonging in each one
of the 7-obesity groups represented in the horizontal axe.

22

Regarding gender effect, the variable female is not significant in any of the
aforementioned regressions (with or without controls). Nevertheless, a very
strong observation emerged when performing the nonparametric tests (see Appendix 2): the negative trend between money requests and obesity or dobese is
confirmed only in the female subsample. Figure 3 gives a very good representation of this result by illustrating the average money requests by obesity level
and gender.
It is clear that obese females (level 5, 6 and 7) request significantly less money
than non-obese females (level 4). On the other hand, in the case of males, the
negative trend is only true (but not significant) for the highest obesity levels (6
and 7), where there are only few observations. In table 4 we replicate table’s 3
regressions separately for the female and male subsamples.

Variable

Table 4: Probit Regressions by Gender
money(.)
money(1/0)
1(a)
1(b)
2(a)
2(b)
Fem. Male
Fem.
Male
Fem. Male
Fem. Male

a) appearance
obesity
-.117
(.094)
dobese
dthin
beauty

.077
(.106)

b) personality
ambition
.089
(.080)
self-est.
.006
(.084)
c) socio-econ
age
-.088
(.070)
age 2
.001
(.001)
wage
-.000
(.0001)
constant
N
P r > chi2

148
.057

-.093
(.096)

-.064
(.140)

-281*
(.164)

-.685*** -.163
(.208) (.193)
-.415
-.059
(.315)
(.273)
.130
.068
.121
.102
(.131) (.102)
(.132) (.109)

-.624** -.111
(.266) (.225)
-.566
-.192
(.341) (.360)
.250* .089
.241*
(.134) (.105) (.136)

-.790***
(.321)
-.086
(.415)
-.040 -.092
.068
.(138) (.176) (.136)

-.149
(.256)
.143
(.255)
-.032
(.169)

.091
(.106)
.045
(.095)

-.031
.081
(.123) (.098)
.189* -.071
(.110) (.081)

.080
.212
.094
(.075) (.144) (.078)
.119 -.151
.107
(.076) .122 (.077)

.100
(.143)
-0.147
(.124)

-.192***
(.076)
.002**
(.001)
-.000
(.0001)

121
0.002

-.044
(.114)

money(> 0)
3(a)
3(b)
Fem. Male
Fem. Male

.094
(.081)
-.017
(0.83)

.090
.077
(.107) (.095)
.050
-.038
(.099) (.084)

-.036
(.123)
.196*
(.116)

-.077 -.196*** -.076 -.228*** -.061 -.235***
(.063)
(.077) (.080) (.076) (.073) (.080)
.001
.002** .001 .002*** .001 .003***
(.001)
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
-.000
.000 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0002
(.000)
(.000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
1.321 2.959** 1.42 2.951*
(1.558) (1.509 (1.408) (1.665)
148
121
148
121
148
121
.0500
0.00 .0805 0.000
.000
0.0001

-.0.93
(.090)

-.097 -.122
(.072) ().147
.001
.001
(.001) (.001)
.0004**.0002**
(.0002) (.001)

88
.0326

66
.0005

-.093
-.120
(0.69) (.149)
.001
.001
(.001) (.002)
-.001 -.000**
(.0001) (.0002)

88
.0013

66
.0005

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter estimates in parentheses. Significance levels are marked with
* for p ≤ 0.10, ** for p ≤ 0.05, and *** for p ≤ 0.01.
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Comparing the results of the above table with the corresponding results
of Table 3, we see that obesity is negatively and significantly associated with
money requests only for the female subsample. We therefore, conclude:
Result 2: The negative association between money, money(1/0), money(> 0)
and dobese is mainly due to the participation of females in the sample.
In other words, females who perceive themselves as obese request significantly less money compared to females who perceive themselves neither obese
nor thin.
Finally, as far as it regards the rest of the variables used as controls in the
regression the following general remarks can be made: 1) Age is negatively associated with the dependent variable in regressions 1(a&b) and 2(a&b), but not in
regressions 3(a&b), possibly because the majority of people that requested 0e
are older. 2) In regressions 3(a&b), the fact that wage turns positive and highly
significant indicates that high-wage people may request more money because
they value their time more than other people. 3) The variable ambition was
only found to be significant in regressions 3(a&b). 4) Despite our expectations
the variable self-esteem is not significant in any regression.

5

Self versus Monitor Reports on Obesity

In absence of any objective measure of obesity, it is critical to check whether
monitors’ reports on subjects’ obesity level is in accordance with self reported
obesity. In particular, we want to find out whether their self-reports on obesity
are also confirmed by their monitors’ reports. Figure 4 shows, for each of the
main obesity categories
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, the percentage of people who underestimate (self-

27 In order to facilitate this analysis we aggregate obesity levels 1, 2 and 3 into the
“thin”category and levels 5, 6 and 7 into the ”obese”category.
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report<monitor’s report), accurately-estimate (self-report=monitor’s report) or
overestimate (self-report>monitor’s report) their own obesity level compared to
the monitor’s evaluation.
Figure 4: Subjects’ reports compared to Monitors’ reports

Note: sr stands for self-reports while mr stands for monitors’ reports on obesity.

It is quite interesting to note that the percentage of people (62%) who overestimate their obesity level in the “obese” category is much higher than the
percentage of “thin” subjects (42%) or the percentage of subjects who categorize themselves as “normal” (44%)28 . A Mann-Whitney test29 confirms that
both percentage differences between obese and normal or obese and thin are
statistically significant with P r > |z| = 0.028 and P r > |z| = 0.010, respectively.
This significant difference makes us believe that monitors’ reports on obesity
may have an different impact on money requests. However, when we repeat the
original regressions by using the monitors’ reported obesity variables, obmr and
dobmr , instead of self-reports (see Appendix 8) we found not any significant
effect related to these variables. This proves that subjects behavior on money
28 The

same picture is true when separating samples by genders,see Appendix 8.
order to perform the test, the binary variable overestimation (=1 if sr>mr, =0 otherwise) is used.
29 In
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requests is only affected by their personal perception on their obesity level and
not on others opinion.
Taking into account the well documented in social psychology studies (Miller
and Downey, 1999) negative relation between perceived weigh and self-esteem,
it seems that people who overestimate their own obesity level probably have
lower self-esteem30 even when compared to other (both underestimating and
accurately-estimating) obese people. Therefore, according to our experimental
setting, it is expected that this particular type of obese person would request a
lower amount of money. In table 5, we repeat type-b (where the dummy variable
dobese is used instead of the original variable obesity) regressions on money(.),
money(1/0) and money(> 0) by including two new variables:
• over an ordinal variable ∈ [0, 5] indicating the level of overestimation of
self-reports as compared to monitors’-reports on obesity (over = sr − mr
if sr > mr and 0 otherwise).
• overob which is the interaction between dobese and over.
Table 5: Probit Regressions by Gender including Obesity overestimation
money(.)
money(1/0)
money(> 0)
1(c)
1(d)
2(c)
2(d)
3(c)
3(d)
Fem Male Fem Male
Fem Male Fem
Male
Fem Male Fem Male
dobese -.698** -.107 .-310 -.372* -.696*** -.025 -.036
-.367 -.786** -.22 -.875*** -.140
(.202) (.190) (.292) (.221) (.263) (.230) (.330)
(.330) (.311) (.263) (.311) (.307)
over
.069 .169 .228** -.336** .177 -.293** .654*** -.490*** -.213* .159 -.238
.244
(.084) (.107) (.103) (.164) (.127) (.116) (.258)
(.172) (.111) (.135) (.153) (.242)
overob
-.408** .321
-.843*** .391
.092 -.126
(.192) (.241)
(.321)
(.266)
(.347) (.292)
N
147
121
147
121
147
121
147
121
88
66
88
66
P r > chi2 .000 .0052 .0000 .0014 .0006 .0000 .0127
.0000
.0004 .0010 .0008 .0006
Variable

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter estimates in parentheses. Significance levels
are marked with * for p ≤ 0.10, ** for p ≤ 0.05, and *** for p ≤ 0.01.
Variables

dthin,

beauty,

ambition,

self

−

esteem,

age,

age2

and

wage

are

used

as

controls.

Two main observations can be made from table’s 5 regressions31 :
30 It is a theoretical assumption. Even this self-overestimated obese sub-sample has not
reported a significant lower self-esteem level.
31 In Appendix 8, we also consider the variable dif f er ∈ [−3, 5] (and obedif respectively)
which is the difference between self-reports and monitors’ reports on obesity. This variable
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• In females’ subsample, when regressing money(.) or money(1/0) the inclusion of both over and overob has an effect on the dependent variables
while it eliminates the significance of the dummy variable dobese. In particular: 1)the interaction term is always negative at a significance level
of 5% for money(.) and of 1% for money(1/0), indicating that the more
an obese female overestimates her obesity level, the less money she requests 2)the variable over is positively related to both money(.) (at 5%
significance level) and money(1/0) (at 1% significance level), which means
that the no-obese (either normal or thin) females who overestimate their
obesity level request for more money.
• In males’ subsample, when regressing money(.) or money(1/0) the variable over is always negative and significant (at 5% and 1% significance
level, respectively) when the interaction term is included in the regressions. This means that the more a thin or normal male overestimates his
obesity level (sr > mr) the less money he requests. However, when the
interaction term is not included in the regression, the variable over is negative and significant (at 5%) only for money(1/0), indicating that males
(of all obesity levels) who overestimate their obesity level do not request
any money at all.
Finally, another interesting result is that when subjects requesting 0e are
excluded from the sample (in 3(c) and 3(d) regressions) there is no any significant
effect of overob while the over is only significant (at 10%) in 3(c) for females. In
females sample, dobese continues to be the main significant explanatory variable.
Concluding this section, the two dimensions of obesity -“objective” (reported
by monitors) and subjective (self-reported)- have an additional impact on money
requests which, moreover, is asymmetric for females and males.
takes also negative values which correspond to the underestimation of obesity level by subjects.
Results, although not so robust, are consistent with the results reported in this section.
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6

Discussion

The basic finding of this study is that self-reported obesity has an effect on
money requests when an opportunity of gaining a positive amount of money
appears. Although, we are not suggesting this as the only explanation for the
wage gap across discrimination, we consider that such a behavior increases the
gap. In fact, our explanation could be considered as a “consequent” one as far
as it is the second part of the “discrimination story”. Discriminated people,
after having suffered discrimination in several social environments, including
job, develop differential behavior by demanding less.
Moreover, we showed that the negative association between obesity and
money is even more robust for the female subsample. This result is supported
by many socio-psychological studies on attractiveness (Hatfield and Sprecher,
1986; Zebrowitz, 1997) which suggest the idea that “females should experience
more differential judgments and treatments based on attractiveness than males,
because human culture values attractiveness more in females than in males”.
However, the negative obesity effect is not confirmed, neither for the female
nor for the male subsample, when a more objective32 estimation of subjects’
obesity is taken into account. Monitors’ reports on subjects obesity level failed
to explain anything related to subjects’ money requests. We, therefore, conclude
that when dealing with obesity is more convenient to detect how people perceive
and feel about their own obesity and not how other people judge them according
this appearance characteristic. Beside the fact that the self-esteem variable of
our experimental setting did not function as we expected, we believe that the
lower money requests by self-reported obese people is related to the finding by
Miller and Downey (1999): People who perceive themselves as heavyweight have
32 Although monitors’ estimations is a more objective measurement compared to the selfreports, still, it is subjective, especially if it is compared to Body-Mass-Index or the WaistCircumference.
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a lower self-esteem.
Moreover, although monitors’ reports on obesity is not a significant explanatory variable for money request, its difference with subjects’ self-reports has
been proved to have an impact on subjects’ behavior. The more an obese female overestimates her obesity level the less money she requests. As far as it
concerns the behavior of non-obese and “normal” subjects, the effect of obesity
is asymmetric across gender: Female over-estimators request more while male
over-estimators request less compared to people who do not overestimate their
obesity level.
The overall conclusion of this study is that self-reported obese people and
especially those females who overestimate their obesity, demand less or nothing
when faced with the opportunity of earning a positive amount of money, a result
that could partially explain the well-established wage gap. Such a generalization of course meets several limitations. As with the vast body of experimental
studies, standard criticisms of the representativeness of our subject pool apply. Furthermore, interviewers’ influence on subjects’ answers could only be
controlled statistically. Another important caveat is that we model an one-shot
interaction between subjects and monitors while in real life the salary negotiation process may last for longer, leaving time to both employers and candidates
to readjust their strategies. Finally, real job seekers are well-prepared for their
“life-time” negotiation, while our not-so-prepared fictional candidates have to
cope suddenly with an unplanned negotiation. For this reason, money requests
of our opportunistic sample might correspond better to an occasional real job
negotiation where the opportunity cost is not as high as in a permanent job.
If one is willing to extrapolate from our experiment to the labor market
more generally, we can draw some very important policy implications for reducing the wage gap: 1) Early childhood intervention programs which focus
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on the enforcement of children’s self-esteem. These programs have been proved
(Heckman, 2000) beneficial for the lifetime earnings as they improve students’
social skills and motivation. 2) Information campaigns and programs against
discrimination in the working environment should aim at encouraging of obese
persons and more importantly of persons who feel obese, although they are not.
3) Information campaigns which aim to change the social convention regarding
the behavior of obese people.
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Appendix 1: Detailed chronological description of the methodological process.
Three types of subjects participated in the experiment.
a) 2 head researchers (MR): Both researchers are members of the Department
of Economic Theory and History at the University of Granada with broad
experience in the experimental field. After designing the experiment, their
main concern was to “train” the mediators to conduct an economic experiment correctly and inform them about basic experimental protocols
related to this particular experiment. The researchers accomplished their
mission through the analysis of the data and the writing of this report.
b) 27 mediators-interviewers (med): All the mediators were students enrolled
in the course titled “Economic Analysis of Collective Relations” (2007)
at the University of Granada. None of the mediators-interviewers had
past experience in the experimental field aside from this particular class.
Given that their participation as interviewers in the experiment had a
solely pedagogical aim, they received a final grade for a presentation based
on the results/conclusions drawn from the data. Communication between
the interviewers and researchers mainly occurred during the 3-hour class.
Some additional instructions and data were provided via e-mail.
c ) 269 subjects (subj): All the subjects were related to the interviewers in
three different ways: 1) friends (59.6%); 2) family members (20%); and 3)
colleagues (20.4%). While the experiment was being conducted (answering
questionnaires), the subjects were in their natural environment.
Step 1. Starting date: October 23, 2007
A. General experimental instructions provided to mediators (Duration: 3 hours) The mediators received general information about experimental procedures, emphasizing important features of experiments such as
anonymity, protection of personal data, the no-deception rule, payments, etc.
Step 2. Starting date: October 30, 2007
A. Specific experimental instructions provided to mediators (Duration: 3 hours) Mediators were informed that they were going to participate
as interviewers in a socioeconomic experiment. To do so, each of the interviewers was asked to find 10 subjects willing to answer some questionnaires. At this
point, the only information interviewers received and had to pass on to their
subjects was as follows:
1. Both subjects and interviewers are required to fill out a questionnaire of
a socioeconomic nature. The questionnaire takes subjects 15 minutes to
complete and interviewers about 1 hour.
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2. The questionnaires are totally anonymous (the completed questionnaires
will be returned to the head researchers in sealed envelopes). The data
will be extracted in a confidential manner and recoded by the 2 chief
researchers to prevent interviewers from identifying their subjects in any
of the remaining steps of the procedure.
3. Interviewers must ensure that the subjects understand that the experiment
is of a socioeconomic nature by emphasizing the fact that subjects will
receive money for their participation at the end of the experiment.
At this point, more detailed instructions were given to the interviewers
(about who was sponsoring the experiment and why) in order convince
them that the payments would be made and would not affect any of the
interviewers’ or researchers’ budgets.
B. Searching for subjects and drawing up a list of names. (Duration:
1 week) The interviewers were required to find 10 subjects within one week’s
time who were willing to participate in the experiment according to the above
instructions. By the end of the week, interviewers were asked to submit a copy
of a coded list of the subjects’ names in order to protect their anonymity.
Step 3. Starting date: November 6, 2007
A. Subjects’ list, interviewers’ questionnaires(Q1) (see appendix 6)
and some additional instructions. (Duration: 3 hours) During a 3hour class, researchers handed in a copy of the interviewers’ coded name list.
The researchers kept another copy in order to remember the order they had
assigned to each subject in order to complete questionnaire Q1. In Q1, the
interviewers had to answer questions related to the physical and psychological
characteristics of each of their subjects (part A). A modified version of the
Sally-Ann task (a well-known psychological experiment) was included in the
questionnaire for distracting subjects attention (part B).
Moreover, highly detailed instructions were given to interviewers about each
of the questions for two main reasons. First, the researchers wanted to be sure
that the interviewers had understood the questions correctly so that they would
give the most appropriate answer. Second, the researchers wanted to prepare
the interviewers so that they would be able to solve any problems that the
subjects might encounter when answering questionnaire Q2 (see appendix 7)
under the supervision of their corresponding interviewer (the researchers were
not present at this phase). It should be emphasized that, at this point, the
researchers did not yet allow the interviewers to know that they were going to
answer the same questions as their subjects (although in this case the subjects
described their own selves). The reason why the researchers decided not to let
this information become common-knowledge is because most of the interviewers
and subjects were either friends or family members and such information may
induce interviewers to answer in a more “friendly” way.
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After the interviewers filled out questionnaire Q1 and handed them back to
the researchers, they were given questionnaire Q2. Each interviewer received
10 Q2 questionnaires and 10 envelopes to deliver to their subjects. Furthermore, the interviewers were given additional instructions related to part C of
questionnaire Q2, which was not included in questionnaire Q1. At this point,
the subjects were clearly informed that they could earn some money from this
process by answering the corresponding question in part C of questionnaire Q2,
which asks subjects to provide their full home-address in order to mail them the
money. They were finally told that the experiment was completely anonymous
and the subjects’ answers must be returned in sealed envelopes.
B. Handing out and receiving back answers for questionnaires Q2
(Duration: 2 weeks) Over the next two weeks, the interviewers were required to deliver questionnaire Q2 and the envelope to their subjects and explain
how to fill them out following the researchers’ instructions.
Step 4. Starting date: November 20, 2007
A. Receiving back questionnaires Q2 and discussion. (Duration: 3
hours) At this stage, the interviewers returned the sealed envelopes with the
subjects’ answers and had time to discuss any problems that may have arisen
during the process. In general, the interviewers encountered no problems regarding the comprehension and answering of the Q2 questionnaires. In some cases,
the interviewers were asked to give additional explanations about the Sally-Ann
task. However, as the interviewers had been properly trained (and had also
carried out the same task), they were able to answer the subjects’ questions.
Moreover, most of the subjects asked the interviewers to confirm if the question
regarding payment for their participation in the experiment was true (part C
in questionnaire Q2). Once again, the interviewers were able to clarify that not
only was the question totally true, but also that the money had been provided
by a governmental/local research institute that had nothing to do with either
the researchers’ or the interviewers’ budget. This reaction by the subjects was
expected since the experiment was held in the subjects’ natural environment
and their interviewers were mostly friends or family members. For this reason,
the researchers insisted that consistent instructions be given in advance.
B. Data extraction (Duration: 2 weeks) Over the following two weeks,
raw data were extracted from both the Q1 and the Q2 questionnaires. The data
were also recoded and given back to the interviewers for further elaboration as
part of a project they were required to do for the course on Economic Analysis
of Collective Relations, thus protecting the anonymity of the subjects.
Step 5. Starting date: December 4, 2007
A.Data delivery and payment instructions (Duration: 3 hours) In
this stage, the raw-recoded data was given to the interviewers together with
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a description of the variables. As regards the payment process, the majority
of the interviewers preferred to receive the subjects’ payments on their behalf
instead of mailing the money to them. To do so, the interviewers were asked to
submit, within two weeks time, signed copies of the ID cards for those subjects
who asked for money in the corresponding question in part C of questionnaire
Q2.
B. Collecting subjects IDs (Duration: 2 weeks) Over the following two
weeks, the interviewers were asked to copy the subjects’ ID cards and submit
them to the researchers in order to receive the payments.
Step 6. Starting date: December 18, 2007
A. Payments (Duration: 3 hours) After submitting a signed copy of the
subjects’ ID cards to the researchers, the interviewers received the payments on
behalf of their subjects . The payment was correlated to part C of questionnaire
Q2. Of course it was impossible for subjects to receive a payment for the exact
amount of money they requested. The researchers decided to pay: a) 10 euros
to the subjects who requested 10 or more euros (in part C); and b) the exact
amount to the subjects who requested less than 10 euros. The interviewers paid
89 subjects a total of 854 euros.
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Appendix 2: Nonparametric test analysis.
In order to test if the differences illustrated in the Preliminary Results section
were also significant, we performed a nonparametric test for trend across ordered
groups. The test is a useful adjustment of the Kruskal-Wallis test for ordered
variables and was first used by Cuzick33 . In the following table we report Cuzick’s z-statistic and the corresponding significance level. The test was performed
separately for the three variables money(.), money(1/0) and money(> 0) generated in the previous section. Cuzick’s z-statistic tests the null hypothesis that
all medians (across the different groups of beauty 34 or obesity) are the same
(Ho : θ1 = θ2 = . . . = θk) against the alternative hypothesis that the medians
are ordered in magnitude (Ha : θ1 <= θ2 <= . . . <= θk). If the alternative
hypothesis is true, then at least one of the differences is a strict inequality (>).
Table 2: Cuzick-Test
Variable money(.)
money(1/0) money(> 0)
z P r > |z| z P r > |z| z P r > |z|
obesity −1.96 0.051 −1.11 0.267 −2.32 0.021
beauty 2.12 0.034 2.25 0.025 0.24 0.807
female −0.08 0.933 1.46 0.144 −0.81 0.418
As we can see regarding the variable money(.), a significant positive trend
among the different groups of beauty and a negative trend among the different
groups of obesity is confirmed. Nevertheless, this result holds only partially for
money(1/0) and money(> 0). For money(1/0) in particular, only the positive
trend on beauty is significant, while for money(> 0) only the negative trend
on obesity is significant 35 . Finally, no gender difference36 is confirmed for any
dependent variable.
Unfortunately, in the case of rejecting the null hypothesis, the test does not
give any information about how many or which groups have ordered medians.
In order to disentangle the exact trends, we performed separate Mann-Whitney
tests, testing for significant differences between two groups in each test
When performing the test for the variable money(.) for all possible obesity
pairs of groups, we found a significant (negative) difference between the medians
of group 4 and group 5 (P r. > |z| = 0.022) and the medians of group 4 and group
6 (P r. > |z| = 0.025). This result, which supports the claim in observation A,
indicates that:
33 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is a similar test in which the majority of cases confirmed
Cuzick’s test results.
34 Note that when we refer to group ”x” of a particular variable, we mean the group of
subjects that have self reported level ”x” on the Likert scale question in Q2 for this particular
variable.
35 We also perform the test for the variables ambition and self-esteem. A positive trend is
confirmed only for ambition and only when money (P r > |z| = 0.035) and money(> 0)(P r >
|z| = 0.074) are tested.
36 The Cuzick-test is equal to the Mann-Whitney test for the binary variable female.
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Nonparametric Result 1: People who consider themselves obese (level 5 or
6) request a lower amount of money than people who consider themselves
neither obese nor thin (level 4).
For the variable beauty, the corresponding pairs that reveal a positive trend
are group 1 with 7 (P r. > |z| = 0.079), group 3 with 7 (P r. > |z| = 0.064), and
group 4 with 7 (P r. > |z| = 0.086). In this case we have to take into account
that groups 1, 3 and 7 included only 2, 9 and 10 observations, respectively, while
group 4 included 97 observations. This also explains why all the above trends
are only significant at the 10% level.
Nonparametric Result 2: People who consider themselves beautiful or handsome (level 7) request significantly more money than people who consider
themselves either “ugly” (level 1 or 3) or average beautiful (level 4).
Moreover, regarding gender, the nonparametric tests do not confirm any
significant difference in the corresponding money requests. Nevertheless, by
splitting the data into two subsamples for males and females and replicating
the above tests by gender, we realize that the negative trend between obesity
and money requests holds only in the female sample 37 . This finding leads to
the following conclusion:
Nonparametric Result 3: Although no significant gender difference was found
regarding the amount of money requested, there is evidence that the negative trend between money requests and obesity or dobese is mainly due
to the participation of females in the sample.
37 For the variable money(.), money(1/0) and money(> 0), level 5 and 6 “obese” females
request significantly less money than “normal” females in level 4. For the variables money(.)
and money(1/0), “beautiful” males in level 7 request significanlty more money than “normal”
males in level 4 or “ugly” males in levels 1 and 2, but very few observations are included in
these categories.
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Appendix 3: Interval and Tobit Regressions.
Table 5: Interval and Tobit Regressions
Interval Regressions
Tobit Regressions
Variable money − interv(.)
money − cont.
obesity

1(a)
-8.27*
(5.08)

1(b)

1(a)
-8.61*
( 5.10)

dobese

-29.27***
(9.67)
-14.64
dthin
(15.38)
6.76 5.80
6.96
beauty
(6.52) (6.47)
(6.65)
female
-1.64 -1.40
-1.18
(12.66) (12.83)
(12.68)
age
-10.32** -10.19** -10.39**
(4.66) (4.45)
(4.63)
age 2
.112* .109*
.113*
(.061) (.059)
(.61)
wage
.000 .001
-.0002
(.007) (.008)
(.008)
ambition 8.27* 8.47*
8.40*
(4.87) (4.86)
(.123)
.567 .066
.448
self-est.
(.458) (4.54)
(.458)
constant (164.64**)144.27**) 165.53**
(79.75) (71.24)
(79.41
N
269
269
269
cens.left
115
115
115
cens.right
24
24
24
P r > chi2 0.0283 0.0048
0.0275

1(b)

-28.19***
(9.63)
13.14
(15.29)
6.05
(6.59)
.921
(12.86)
-10.27**
(.080)
.110*
(.059)
-.0007
(.008)
8.62*
(4.81)
.053
(.453)
143.11**
(70.65)
269
115
24
0.0018

NOTE: SE and Sign. level as previous tables. Left-censored
observations (154) if money(.) = 0 and right-censored observations (24) if money(.) > 0
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Appendix 4: Adding control variables in Ordered Probit
Regression 1(b).
Table 5: Ordered Probit Regressions
Variable
money(.)
1(b1) 1(b2) 1(b3) 1(b4) 1(b5)
dobese -.42***-.42*** -.43*** -.43***-.42***
dthin
beauty
female
age
age 2
wage

(.13)
-.15
(.20)
.15**
(.07)
-.01
(.14)

(.13)
-.23
(.20)
.11
(.07)
-.05
(.14)
-.13**
(.06)
.001*
(.000)

(.13)
-.17
(.20)
.13*
(.07)
-.10
(.14)

(.13)
-.14
(.20)
.11
(.07)
.03
(.15)

(.13)
-.15
(.20)
.14*
(.07)
.01
(.14)

-.0002**
.0001

ambition

.10**
(.05)

self-est.

.03
(.05)
N
269
269
269
269
269
P r > chi2 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0017 0.0017
NOTE: SE and Sign. level as previous tables.
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Appendix 5: Probit Regressions by Gender.
Table 6(a): Probit Regressions by Gender

Female Sample
Variable

money(.)
money(1/0)
1(a)
1(b)
2(a) 2(b) 3(a)
obesity -.117
-.044
-.281*
(.094)
( .114)
(.164)
dobese
-.685***
-.624**
(.208)
(.266)
dthin
-.415
-.566
(.315)
(.341)
beauty .077 .068 .102 .089 -.040
(.106) (.102) (.109) (.105) .(138)
age
-.088 -.077 -.076 -.061 -.097
(.070) (.063) (.080) (.073) (.072)
age 2
.001
.001 ..001 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
wage
-.000 -.000 -.0001 -.0002 .000
(.0001) (.000) (.0001)(.0001)(.0002)
ambition .089 .094 .077 .081 .080
(.080) (.081) (.095) (.098) (.075)
self-est. .006 -.017 -.038 -.071 .119
(.084) (.083) (.084) (.081) (.076)
constant
1.321 1.42
(1.558 (1.408)
N
148
148
148
148
88
P r > chi2 0.057 0.0000 0.0805 0.0000 0.0326

money(> 0)
3(b)

-.685***
(.208)
-.415
(.315)
.068
(.102)
-.076
(.064)
.001
(.001)
-.000
(.0001)
.094
(.082)
-0.17
(.083)

88
0.0013

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters ininterviewers) of parameter
estimates in parentheses. Significance level aremarked with * for p <= 0.10,
** for p <= 0.05, and *** for p <= 0.01.
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Table 6(b): Probit Regressions by Gender

Male Sample
Variable

money(.)
money(1/0)
1(a)
1(b)
2(a)
2(b)
3(a)
obesity -.093
-.064
-.281
(.096)
( .140)
(.164)
dobese
-.163
-.111
(.193)
(.225)
dthin
-.059
-.192
(.273)
(.360)
.130
.121
.250* .241* -.040
beauty
(.131) (.132) (.134) (.136) .(138)
age -.192***-.196***-.228***-.235*** -.097
(.076) (.077) (.076) (.080) (.072)
age 2
.002** .002** .002*** .003*** .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
wage
-.000
.000 -.0001 -.0002 .0004**
(.0001) (.000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
ambition .091
.090
-.031
-.036
.080
(.106) (.107) (.123) (.123) (.075)
.050
.189* .196* .119
self-est. .045
(.095) (.099) (.110) (.116) (.076)
constant
2.959** 2.951*
(1.509 (1.665)
N
121
121
121
121
66
P r > chi2 0.0020 0.0048 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005

money(> 0)
3(b)

-.149
(.256)
.143
(.255)
-.087
(.169)
-.120
(.149)
.001
(.002)
-.000**
(.0002)
.210
(.143)
-0.147
(.124)

66
0.0005

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters ininterviewers) of parameter
estimates in parentheses. Significance level aremarked with * for p <= 0.10,
** for p <= 0.05, and *** for p <= 0.01.
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Appendix 6: Questionnaire Q1.
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An experiment of the students of the course
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE
RELATIONS 2007

QUESTIONNAIRE

Interviewer: . . . . . . . . . . . .
Profesor in charge: Pablo Brañas Garza
Assistant Profesor: Antonios Proestakis
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PART 1
With the following questions you are going to describe
your friends’ physical characteristics and their personality. Please put the name list in front of you and check
the number that describes better the level of the following characteristics for each one of your subjects:
Regarding their physical characteristics:
a) ugly :. . . 1. . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . handsome/beautiful
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 2:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 3:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 4:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 5:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 6:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 7:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 8:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 9:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
Subject 10:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
b) thin :. . . 1. . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . obese
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
c) badly dressed :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . well-dressed
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
d) short :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . tall
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
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Regarding their personality:
e) shy :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . leader
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .

f ) introverted :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very social
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .

g) anodyne :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7creative
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .

h) bad person :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . nice person
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .

i) no ambitious :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very ambitious
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .

j) no self-esteem :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very self-esteem
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
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PART 2
Observe the following figures and answer the corresponded question
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Imagine that Sara is one (each time) of your subjects
(Anna could be anyone else but one of the other subjects). Sara arrives back from school and she wants to
play with her doll. Where is she going to look for it?
Please mark the letter (a-k) that corresponds to the action that characterizes better your subjects behavior.
Subject 1 looks for the doll
. . . a. . . b. . . c. . . d . . . e. . . f . . . g. . . h. . . i. . . j. . . k. . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 looks for the doll
. . . a. . . b. . . c. . . d . . . e. . . f . . . g. . . h. . . i. . . j. . . k. . .
a) In her own box because she knows (100%, Anna’s box 0%) that Anna has put it
there.
b) In her own box because she almost does not have any doubts (90%, Anna’s box
10%) that Anna has put it there.
c) In her own box because she is very sure (80%, Anna’s box 20%) that Anna has put
it there.
d) In her own box because but she is not so sure (70%, Anna’s box 30%) that Anna
has put it there.
e) In her own box because she thinks (60%, Anna’s box 40%) that Anna has put it
there.
f ) In any of the two boxes (50%, Anna’s box 50%) since she does not know at all
where Anna has put it.
g) In Anna’s box because she thinks (60%, Sara’s box 40%) that Anna has place it
there.
h) In Anna’s box because she is quite sure (70%, Sara’s box 30%) that Anna has
place it there.
i) In Anna’s box because she is very sure (80%, Sara’s box 20%) that Anna has place
it there.
j) In Anna’s box because she almost does not have any doubt (90%, Sara’s box 10%)
that Anna has place it there.
k) In Anna’s box because she knows (100%, Sara’s box 0%) that Anna has place it
there.
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PART 3
Description of the relation with subjects.
a) What is your relation with each one of your subjects (brother, spouse, flatmate,
partner, boyfriend, etc.) :
Subject 1:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b) Mark the level that describes better your relation with each one of your subjects
(independently of being friends or family), according to the following scale of
relationship.
flat relationship:. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . close relationship
Subject 1:. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 10 :. . . . . . 1. . . . . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . . . .
c) In the case that some of your subjects work, please fill in the following table:
Subject 1works in . . . . . . . . . and I think that he/she earns about . . . . . . . . .
.
. ..
Subject 1works in . . . . . . . . . and I think that he/she earns about . . . . . . . . .
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Appendix 7: Questionnaire Q2.
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An experiment of the students of the course
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE
RELATIONS 2007

QUESTIONNAIRE

Interviewee(subject’s code, not the NAME): . . . . . . . . . . . .
Interviewer: . . . . . . . . . . . .
Profesor in charge: Pablo Brañas Garza
Assistant Profesor: Antonios Proestakis
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PART 1
In the following questions you are asked to describe
your physical characteristics and your personality. Please
check the number that describes better the level of the
following characteristics:
Regarding your physical characteristics, you consider yourself:
(note that 4 means neither the one nor the other characteristic)
a) ugly :. . . 1. . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . handsome/beautiful
(note that 4 means neither ugly nor handsome)

b) thin :. . . 1. . . 2. . . . . . 3. . . . . . 4. . . . . . 5. . . . . . 6. . . . . . 7. . . obese

c) badly dressed :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . well-dressed
d) short :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . tall

Regarding your personality, you consider yourself:
e) shy :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . leader

f ) introverted :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very social

g) anodyne :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7creative

h) bad person :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . nice person

i) no ambitious :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very ambitious

j) no self-esteem :. . . 1. . . 2. . . 3. . . 4 . . . 5. . . 6 . . . 7. . . very self-esteem
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PART 2
Observe the following figures and answer the corresponded questions:
SAME PICTURES AS APPENDIX 6
A. Imagine that Sara and Anna could be any person.
Sara arrives back from school and she wants to play
with her doll. Where is she going to look for it?
Please mark the corresponded letter (a-k) ( you must
mark only one).
a) In her own box because she knows (100%, Anna’s box 0%) that Anna has
put it there.
b) In her own box because she almost does not have any doubt (90%, Anna’s
box 10%) that Anna has put it there.
c) In her own box because she is very sure (80%, Anna’s box 20%) that Anna
has put it there.
d) In her own box although she is not so sure (70%, Anna’s box 30%) that
Anna has put it there.
e) In her own box because she thinks (60%, Anna’s box 40%) that Anna has
put it there.
f ) In any of the two boxes (50%, Anna’s box 50%) since she does not know at
all where Anna has put it.
g) In Anna’s box because she thinks (60%, Sara’s box 40%) that Anna has
place it there.
h) In Anna’s box because she is quite sure (70%, Sara’s box 30%) that Anna
has place it there.
i) In Anna’s box because she is very sure (80%, Sara’s box 20%) that Anna has
place it there.
j) In Anna’s box because she almost does not have any doubt (90%, Sara’s box
10%) that Anna has place it there.
k) In Anna’s box because she knows (100%, Sara’s box 0%) that Anna has
place it there.
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B. Imagine that YOU are Sara. Where are you going to look for your doll? Please mark the corresponded letter (l-v) ( you must mark only one).
a) In my own box because I know (100%, Anna’s box 0%) that Anna has put
it there.
b) In my own box because I almost do not have any doubt (90%, Anna’s box
10%) that Anna has put it there.
c) In my own box because I ma very sure (80%, Anna’s box 20%) that Anna
has put it there.
d) In my own box although I am not so sure (70%, Anna’s box 30%) that Anna
has put it there.
e) In my own box because I think (60%, Anna’s box 40%) that Anna has put
it there.
f ) In any of the two boxes (50%, Anna’s box 50%) since I do not know at all
where Anna has put it.
g) In Anna’s box because I think (60%, Sara’s box 40%) that Anna has place
it there.
h) In Anna’s box because I am quite sure (70%, Sara’s box 30%) that Anna
has place it there.
i) In Anna’s box because I am very sure (80%, Sara’s box 20%) that Anna has
place it there.
j) In Anna’s box because I almost do not have any doubt (90%, Sara’s box
10%) that Anna has place it there.
k) In Anna’s box because I know(100%, Sara’s box 0%) that Anna has place it
there.
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PART 3
At this moment, we would like to know the amount of money that you would
like to request as a compensation for the effort you made to complete the questionnaire and for the information you provide us. The money disposed for this
research project is given by the Spanish State. Do not forget that this money
does not belong neither to us (neither affect us) nor to the Spanish State.
How much money would you like to receive for filling out this questionnaire?

I request the following amount of money: . . . . . . euros
In the attached stick we would like you to fill in your full name and address in
order for us to send your money by mail. Obviously, this is optional, but in
the case you want to receive your payment it is the only way. Please read the
following compromise regarding data protection.

PAPER STICK HERE
Please, provide us with your phone number or e-mail address (or both), in order
to contact you in about two weeks time for confirming the reception of the money
sent.
Mobile number:
E-mail:
According to the Law of Data Protection, the information provided in the previous pages is not going to be corresponded with your personal data. Finally, in
Economics Faculty, there are constantly experiments organized. In these experiments, of various types (on-line, by mail, presence, etc) different types of people
participate and of course money are earned depending on participantsperformance on the tasks. If you like it, we can include your personal data in our
data base in order to inform you when you can earn some money. In order to
be more operative and no annoying you for things that you are not interested
in, we ask you to tell us from which amount of money you would be interested
in participating.
• Are you interested in participating in one of these? YES. . . . . . NO. . . . . .
• In the case of being interesting, from which amount money would you
willing to participate?. . . . . .
• If you had to come to the Faculty of Economics (Cartuja), would you do
it? YES. . . . . . NO. . . . . .
Thank you very much for your effort and help, Pablo Brañas Garza and
Antonios Proestakis, University of Granada.
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Appendix 8: Monitors’ reports for obesity
Figure 5: Subjects’ reports compared to Monitors’ reports by gender.

Note: sr stands for self-reports while mr stands for monitors’ reports on obesity.

Table 5: Probit Regressions by Gender for monitor reported obesity
money(.)
money(1/0)
money(> 0)
1(a)
1(b)
2(a)
2(b)
3(a)
3(b)
Fem. Male Fem. Male
Fem. Male Fem. Male
Fem. Male Fem. Male
a) appearance
obmr
-.078 .056
-.085 .109
-.022 -.091
(.070) (.071)
(.080) (.085)
(.094) (.076)
dobmr
-.019
.095
.045
.220
-.181 -.431
(.317) (.292)
(.325) (.356)
(.311) (.327)
dthin
.314
-.080
.431
-.143
-.045 -.183
(.265) (.270)
(.289) (.289)
(.302) (.259)
beauty
-.095 .114
.100
.120
.119 .244* .127 .258** -.005 -.081 -.018 -.150
(.109) (.125) (.100) (.125) (.109) (.131) (.100) (.131) (.131) (.187) (.125) (.160)
b) personality
ambition
.084
.103
.078
.098
.071 -.007 .061
-.018
.088 .200 .086 .231*
(.081) (.107) (.082) (.107) (.097) (.120) (.095) (.120) (.081) (.145) (.080) (.136)
.002
.031 .003
.032
-.046 .170 -.039
.174
.125 -.146 .128* -.148
self est.
(.086) (.010) (.083) (.101) (.085) (.117) (.079) (.120) (.077) (.118) (.074) (.124)
c) socio-econ
age
-.077 -.208*** -.068 -.207*** -.062 -.253*** -.052 -.252*** -.084 -.128 -.092 -.116
(.74) (.077) (.078) (.078) (.082) (.078) (.085) (.078) (.080) (.152) (.084) (.157)
age 2
.001 .002** .001 .002** .001 .002*** .001 .002*** .001 .001 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) ( .001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
wage
-.001
.001 -.001
.001
-.001 -.001 -.001
.001
.001 .001** .001 .001**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
constant
1.16 2.75* .479 3.14**
(1.49) (1.60) ( 1.62) (1.55)
N
147
121
148
121
147
121
148
121
88
66
.88
66
P r > chi2 .0511 .0016 .0812 .0021 .0488 .0001 .0351 .0001 .1565 .0007 .2468 .0001
Variable

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter estimates in parentheses. Significance levels
are marked with * for p ≤ 0.10, ** for p ≤ 0.05, and *** for p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 5: Probit Regressions by Gender including Misestimation
money(.)
money(1/0)
money(> 0)
1(c)
1(d)
2(c)
2(d)
3(c)
3(d)
Fem Male Fem Male
Fem Male Fem Male Fem Male Fem
Male
dobese -.702*** -.090 -.441* .-193 -.686*** -.002 -.298 -.109 -.768*** -.207 -.833*** -.184
(.199) ( .195)(.250) (.190) (.257) (.227) (.304) (.271) (.310) (-256) (.238) (.269)
differ
.0408 -.129* .124 -.186* .102 -.199** .250** -.249* -.116 .086 -.129
.107
(.108) (.079) (.080) (.108) (.092) (.099) .(118) (-138) (.078) (.101) (.108) (.165)
-.292* .156
-.463** .147
.073
-.044
obedif
(.156) (.187)
(.233) (.222)
(.265) (.244)
N
147
121 147 121
147
121
147
121
88
66
.88
66
.0005
P r > chi .0000 .0030 .0000 .0023 .0015 .0000 .0035 .0000 .0011 .0018 .0031

Variable

Note: Standard errors (adjusted for 27 clusters in interviewers) of parameter estimates in parentheses. Significance levels
are marked with * for p ≤ 0.10, ** for p ≤ 0.05, and *** for p ≤ 0.01.
Variables

dthin,

beauty,

ambition,

self

− esteem,
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age,

age2

and

wage

are

used

as

controls.
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